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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
if the decision is not an "untainted determination," "' the court may
refuse the waiver and grant a severance instead.
Thus the practitioner who could, prior to this decision, under
the Scott v. McCaffrey 2 rule, waive a jury after severance bad
been denied, and thus in reality effect a severance, has lost a
procedural device valuable in separating his client from the others.
It may well be, after this case, that the practioner will find his
client tied to the other defendants with bonds that cannot be broken.
A
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION - APPORTIONMENT - AMOUNT OF
CLAIM BASED ON ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT AND INCLUDIBLE IN THE
GROSS TAx ESTATE HELD SUBJECT TO APPORTIONMENT.- In a
proceeding to settle their account, the executors of the decedent's
estate sought to have the widow pay her apportioned share of the
estate taxes under Section 124 of the New York Decedent Estate
Law. Decedent and his widow had entered into an antenupital
agreement under the terms of which each mutually waived his rights
in the other's estate, including his right of election. ' As additional
consideration for the contract, the decedent agreed that if the widow
survived him she would be entitled to the remaining annuity pay-
ments due under an agreement between the decedent and his em-
ployer. The widow contended that she was a contract creditor
of the estate and that, as such, no tax could be apportioned against
these annuity payments since they were nontestamentary assets
although they were included in the gross taxable estate. The Court,
applying federal estate tax concepts of consideration, held that this
antenuptial agreement was not a contract which created a legal
obligation exempt from apportionment under section 124, but was in
reality a gift taking effect at death against which there must be
apportionment. Estate of Samuel Lipshie, 145 N.Y.L.J. 15, col.
5 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
Section 124 of the Decedent Estate Law provides for equitable
apportionment of the estate taxes due among all "the persons inter-
ested in the gross tax estate . . . to whom such property is or may
31 People v. Diaz, supra note 28 at 93, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 40. The Court
does not spell out the meaning of this phrase.
32 12 Misc. 2d 671, 172 N.Y.S2d 954 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
1 N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 18. This section provides that when a de-
cedent dies testate, the surviving spouse is entitled to elect his or her share
of the estate as in intestacy subject to certain limitations. There is also
included a provision allowing a Waiver of the right of election.
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be transferred or to whom any benefit therein accrues" 2 unless a
contrary intent is expressed by the testator in the will or in a
nontestamentary instrument. The taxes are to be apportioned
"among the persons benefited in the proportion that the value of
the property or interest received by [them] bears to the total value
of the property and interest received by all persons benefited. . . ." 3
Most courts have interpreted section 124 to mean that all of
the property which taxing authorities have included in the gross tax
estate is subject to apportionment. 4 This interpretation is significant
because inter vivos trusts,5 Totten trusts 6 and other inter vivos
transactions which are part of the gross tax estate are made subject
to apportionment. 7 A few courts have implied that this general
interpretation of section 124 is too broad and have exempted a
contract creditor from apportionment although the property received
2 N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 124(1).
3 N.Y. DFcED. EsT. LAW § 124(3) (i). A deduction or exemption which
was allowed to the estate by the taxing authorities because of some special
characteristic of the person or organization receiving the benefit, e.g., the
marital deduction or the charitable deduction, is to be allowed to that person
or organization exclusively, for purposes of section 124. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954 §§ 2055-56. The following example will help to clarify the application
of this section of the statute. Assume all deductions, exemptions and allow-
able expenses have been taken out of the gross estate, leaving an adjusted
gross estate of $120,000, and assume the allowable marital deduction to be
$60,000. If $70,000 were received by the spouse, the amount subject to ap-
portionment would be computed in the following manner:
Adjusted Gross Estate $120,000 § 124 Benefit Received $ 70,000
Allowable Marital Marital Deduction 60,000
Deductions 60,000
Amount Subject to
Gross Taxable Estate $ 60,000 Apportionment $ 10,000
Since the amount of the benefit received by the wife which is subject to
apportionment is $10,000 and the gross taxable estate is $60,000, the wife
must pay 1/6 or 162/39o of the taxes charged against the estate. See, e.g.,
In the Matter of the Accounting of Smithers, 15 Misc. 2d 701, 181 N.Y.S.2d
702, modified, 17 Misc. 2d 979, 188 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Surr. Ct. 1959) ; In the
Matter of the Estate of Peters, 204 Misc. 333, 88 N.Y.S.2d 142, 147 (Surr. Ct.)
aff'd nien., 275 App. Div. 950, 89 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1949).4 1n the Matter of the Accounting of Townsend, 200 Misc. 740, 170
N.Y.S.2d 210 (Surr. Ct. 1951); In the Matter of the Estate of Kaufman,
170 Misc. 436, 10 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Surr. Ct. 1939). "The court is bound by
the actual fact of inclusion or exclusion of the property by the taxing
authorities." Id. at 445, 10 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
5 In the Matter of the Estate of Corlies, 174 Misc. 459, 21 N.Y.S.2d 243
(Surr. Ct. 1940). The court, in discussing a clause in the will Which specific-
ally directed executors to pay the estate taxes without apportionment, said:
"This provision . . . discloses no intent on the part of testatrix to relieve
the inter vivos trust from bearing its proportionate share of taxes pursuant to
the provisions of section 124... " Id. at 461, 21 N.Y.S.2d at 244.
6 In the Matter of the Accounting of Townsend, szupra note 4.
7In the Matter of the Estate of Leonard, 16 Misc. 2d 465, 184 N.Y.S.2d
552 (Surr. Ct.) aff'd, 9 App. Div. 2d 1, 189 N.Y.S.2d 422 (3d Dep't 1959);
In the Matter of the Accounting of Smithers, supra note 3.
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was includible in the -gross tax estate.8 This rationale has been
applied in cases where there was a separation agreement under
which the decedent was legally obligated to make a property settle-
ment for his wife.9
The leading case which followed this reasoning was Matter of
Brokaw.10 There, the decedent established a trust for his spouse
pursuant to a separation agreement, which trust was held to be
part of the decedent's taxable estate."1 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed per curiam the lower court's determination which denied the
executor's right to apportion estate taxes against the widow. A
strong dissent was registered by Judge Desmond in which he
said:
[C]ompliance with that statute [section 124] requires a spreading of these
taxes against the beneficial interests, including the trust estate. That the
trust was established to discharge an obligation is immaterial. . . . Apportion-
ment against the benefited person follows as a direct and necessary conse-
quence of the inclusion of the transferred property in the gross tax estate,
and payment of the tax.12
The view of the dissenting opinion, although it seems logical, has
not been adopted by the courts in subsequent cases involving
separation agreements.13
In one case, In re Patterson's Will,14 the Surrogate's Court,
f~iced with an antenuptial agreement, the proceeds of which were in-
cluded in the gross tax estate, adopted the same reasoning as the
cases involving separation agreements. The court determined that
since the wife had an enforceable claim against the estate, the property
she received was not subject to apportionment.' 5
In none of these cases did the court concern itself with what
constitutes good and valuable consideration for a contract claim
under the federal estate tax law. In finding that the wife had an
enforceable claim against the estate, the courts relied on the common-
8 In the Matter of the Estate of Oppenheimer, 166 Misc. 522, 2 N.Y.S.2d
786 (Surr. Ct. 1938). See In the Matter of the Estate of Porter, 12 Misc. 2d
180, 176 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Surr. Ct. 1958), and cases cited therein.
9 In the Matter of the Accounting of Cordier, 1 Misc. 2d 887, 145 N.Y.S.2d
855 (Surr. Ct. 1955) ; In the Matter of the Will of Brokaw, 180 Misc. .490,
41 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 555, 59 N.E.2d 243 (1944)
(per curiam).
10 See note 9 .mpra.
liHelvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940).
This is the case which held the trust includible in the gross taxable estate.
12 In the Matter of the Will of Brokaw, 293 N.Y. 555, 561, 59 N.E.2d
243, 246 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
13 In the Matter of the Estate of Porter, 12 Misc. 2d 180, 176 N.Y.S.2d 366
(Surr. Ct. 1958) ; In the Matter of the Accounting of McKeon, 4 Misc. 2d
931, 124 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
'4 73 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
15 Id. at 436-37.
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law concept of consideration 16 under which a promise to marry is
good consideration.' 7  However, the estate tax law provides that
in order that a contract claim may be deducted from the gross tax
estate it must be based on consideration in "money or money's
worth." 18 Common-law consideration is not necessarily considera-
tion in "money or money's worth." 19 The Internal Revenue Code
specifically declares that the relinquishment of marital rights does
not constitute adequate consideration.20
The Court in the instant case, relying on estate tax concepts of
consideration, determined that since this agreement was not entered
into for consideration in "money or money's worth" with the re-
sulting inclusion of the value of the annuity in the gross taxable
estate, the annuity was in reality a gift and not a legal obligation
which would exempt the person receiving it from apportionment.
The Court cited with approval Matter of Gal~e'tZ,2' where the
decedent's son had a valid option to buy stock from the estate of his
father, but the option price was below the value placed on the stock
by tax authorities. The difference was included in the gross tax
estate. The court said:
[W]hile the option is valid in contract law its status tax-wise is not that
of a bona fide sale contract, but of a transfer, part-sale, and part-gift.
As t9 the part-gift the tax is imposed, and, therefore, apportioned to the part-
donee.22
The Court in the principal case also discussed Matter of Ryle,2
in which the court there viewed section 124 as a procedural device,
and determined that once the property is included in the gross tax
estate and subject to estate tax, the terms of section 124 automatically
apply.
The Court also discussed and distinguished the earlier New
York cases.2 4 The area of distinction is that in the earlier cases
16 See In the Matter of the Will of Brokaw, supra note 9; In Re Patter-
son's Will. 73 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
'1 De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917). In Prewit
v. Wilson, 103 U.S. 22 (1880), an antenuptial conveyance of property for
the consideration of marriage was held to supersede the rights of creditors if
there was no knowledge of the intent to defraud the creditors on the part
of the party receiving the conveyance.
Is INT. Ray. CODE oF 1954 § 2053(c).
19 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).20 INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954 § 2043. See In the Matter of the Estate of
Seitz, 262 N.Y. 32, 186 N.E. 193 (1933).
21 3 App. Div. 2d 280, 160 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd mem.,
5 N.Y.2d 721, 152 N.E.2d 666, 177 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1958).
22 In the Matter of the Estate of Galewitz, 3 App. Div. 2d 280, 293-94, 160
N.Y.S.2d 564, 579 (1st Dep't 1957).
23 170 Misc. 450, 10 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
24 See notes 9 and 14 supra, and the cases cited therein. "After close
scrutiny . . . this court is of the opinion that the cases involving separation
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the spouses' claims could not be diminished by taxes, i.e., the de-
cedent intended the spouse to have the whole amount of the con-
tractual benefits without diminution. Relying on the provision in
section 124, allowing the decedent to provide for a different scheme
of apportionment than that called for in the statute, these earlier
cases inferred that the decedent had expressed an intent to exempt
the proceeds thereof from apportionment. These cases reasoned that,
if pursuant to an antenuptial or separation agreement, the husband
provided that his wife should receive a definite sum, then it was
clear that the intent of the husband now deceased was to give his
wife the entire amount without deduction for any apportionment of
estate taxes.25  However, the Court in the instant case refused to
infer that the decedent husband desired to exempt the spouse's in-
terest from diminution. The Court assumed that the decedent con-
templated the impact of taxes. It might be argued that since the
intent of the decedent was unexpressed in the earlier cases as well
as here, there is no distinction.
The distinction of the case of In re Patterson's Will,26 the only
case distinguished which involved an antenuptial agreement, appears
even more tenuous. In that case, the spouse had an antenuptial
agreement whereby the decedent agreed to leave his wife a life in-
terest in certain property if she survived him. Similarly, in the
principal case, the spouse had an antenuptial agreement whereby she
would receive a life interest in property if she survived the de-
cedent. It is submitted that the spouse's interest in the principal
case is the same as the spouse's interest in the Patterson case.
Most of the cases which this Court distinguished involved the
proceeds from separation agreements, which, although part of the
gross tax estate, were held free from apportionment. 27 Here there
may be a valid ground for distinction because in the estate tax
area proceeds of a separation agreement are not now includible in
the gross tax estate,28 whereas proceeds of an antenuptial agree-
ment are.29  However, this distinction is untenable in this context
because in the earlier cases cited by the Court the tax authorities
agreements and Matter of Patterson . . . must be distinguished." Estate
of Samuel Lipshie, 145 N.Y.L.J. 15, col. 5 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
25 This holding is contrary to the majority of the cases which hold that
decedent must express his intent not to follow the apportionment statute in a
will or non-testamentary instrument. See In the Matter of Estate of Duryea,
277 N.Y. 310, 14 N.E.2d 369 (1938) ; In the Matter of the Estate of Ryan, 178
Misc. 1007, 36 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Surr. Ct. 1942), affd mere., 265 App. Div. 1051,
41 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1st Dep't 1943). But see In the Matter of the Estate of
Martin, 176 Misc. 805, 29 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
26 73 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
27 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Estate of Porter, 12 Misc. 2d 180, 176
N.Y.S.2d 366 (Surr. Ct. 1958), and cases cited therein.
28 Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950) ; 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
29 xT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2043.
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at that time did include the proceeds of the separation agreement
in the gross tax estate.30 Since this distinction is invalid, these
earlier cases involving separation agreements must also rely on the
above distinction that the spouse's interest was not intended to be
diminished by taxes.
As to the procedure for paying the estate taxes apportioned
against the widow in the instant case,31 the Court provided that
the company which was to pay the annuity should deduct a per-
centage of the monthly annuity payment, as it becomes due, for
taxes. Since there was no separate trust established with which
to pay the annuity, the question arises as to who would meet this
liability if the company should become insolvent. Would the widow
have to pay the full amount of the liability although she didn't
receive the full amount of the payments?
The purpose of section 124 was to relieve the residuary estate
from the burden of paying the entire estate tax by spreading the tax
liability over all the property included in the gross tax estate.32
This purpose was frustrated by those cases which, following the
reasoning of Matter of Brokaw,3 3 exempted from apportionment
property included in the gross tax estate which was subject to
contract claims. The Court here seems to be taking a large step
forward in giving to the statute the construction it was originally
intended to have, i.e., if the property is includible in the gross tax
estate, it is automatically subject to its apportioned share of the
taxes.
M
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - LABOR LAW - FEDERAL COURTS Au-
THORIZED TO ENJOIN STRIKES IN VIOLATION OF COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AGREEMENTS DESPITE SECTION 4 OF NORRIS-LAGUARDIA
ACT.- Appellant labor union set up picket lines in an attempt to
organize non-union office employees of appellees, six interstate motor
carriers. In separate actions by the latter to enjoin the union's
picketing as a violation of the no-strike clause of separate collective
bargaining agreements, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit, held that despite the prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act against the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, the federal
courts under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) have jurisdiction to enjoin strikes which are in
30 In the Matter of the Estate of Porter, supra note 27.
31 Since the executor had already paid the tax, the widow was to pay her
apportioned share to the estate.
32 2 Butler, Nmv YoRK SURROGATE LAW AND PRAcriCm § 1847 (1941).
3 180 Misc. 491, 41 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 555,
59 N.E.2d 243 (1944) (per curiamn).
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